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ABSTRACT
The capability approach to human development, which has been very
influential within the United Nations Development Programme, has
been instrumental in bringing out an emphasis on final goals of
development connected to the expansion of human freedom. Because
these final goals are also seen as means for further development, there
is a tendency to neglect other means of development, such as changes
in the productive structure and in the distribution of power within the
relations of production. Here I assess the intellectual origins of the
capability approach to human development, and its influence on
development discourse. I argue that it is important to bring back to
development discourse, and to the capability approach to human
development in particular, a concern with productive structures that
characterised earlier approaches to development centred on
industrialisation. This requires a greater focus on how power







Recent transformations in development discourse have been in the direction of moving away from
productive systems, while focusing essentially on the goals of development, be it the Millennium
Development Goals, the Sustainable Development Goals, and other goals connected to the measure-
ment of human well-being (Chang 2010). The evolution of the field of welfare economics contributed
much to this state of affairs. A particularly influential approach along these lines has been the capa-
bility approach to human development, originally advanced by Amartya Sen (1982, 1985), which has
been widely influential within the United Nations Development Programme. This more ‘humanistic’
view of development, as Ha-Joon Chang (2010) calls it, stands in contrast to a ‘productionist’ view that
characterises earlier approaches to development, which were focused on how the developmental
state can foster the transformation of productive systems, and the process of industrialisation in par-
ticular (Kaldor 1978, Chang 2002, 2010).
The term ‘productionist’ is not defined clearly by Chang (2010), as it is aimed at covering a general
concern with production. There have been proposals of combining the capability approach to human
development with a concern with production, focusing more specifically on the classical theory of
production as developed by Piero Sraffa (1960), which like Sen’s contribution, is connected to the
Cambridge economic tradition (Martins 2013). Such proposals have been made by Vivian Walsh
(2000, 2003) and Hilary Putnam (2002) – see also Putnam and Walsh (2012) and Martins (2013) for
further elaborations. This suggestion is particularly useful for addressing global value chains
(Gereffi et al. 2005) not least because Sraffa (1925, 1926) showed that the classical theory of
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production is more adequate for dealing with interconnected production systems than neoclassical
economic theory, as Sen (2003) himself notes.
Sraffa’s argument is even more plausible now, when global value chains are even more intercon-
nected. Sen’s (2003) own research on Sraffa sheds light on this issue, by noting how Sraffa’s (1960)
analysis of production does not presuppose constant returns to scale, which means it can be used
in the analysis of various types of production networks regardless of the nature of the returns to
scale. But this concern with production, and what Chang (2010) calls the ‘productionist’ view, has
been essentially neglected within the capability approach to human development.
Sen (1983) argued, in an article titled ‘Development: Which Way Now?’ that development econ-
omics, conceived as a concern with industrialisation, was facing a crisis given the emergence of neo-
classical economics and its emphasis on the market sphere, while replying to critiques of Albert
Hirschman, and advancing the capability approach to human development as an alternative,
together with Sen’s (1981) entitlement approach to poverty. Sen (1983) argues that traditional
approaches to development centred on industrialisation were successful in identifying the causes
of economic growth, but failed in providing a fuller characterisation of development, which accord-
ing to Sen should be seen as an expansion of human capabilities.
I argue below that the project of human development is now also facing its own dilemma, which
springs from an excessive concentration on measuring human capabilities conceived as final goals of
development, while neglecting the more ‘productionist’ view of development as argued by Chang
(2010). However, I shall also argue that a return to the ‘productionist’ approach to development is
not incompatible with Sen’s more ‘humanistic’ approach, especially if we take into account the exist-
ing attempts of integrating the capability approach to human development with the classical theory
of production (Walsh 2000, 2003, Putnam 2002, Putnam and Walsh 2012, Martins 2013).
Particularly important in this regard is the role of power relationships in the productive system
(Braverman 1974, Wilkinson 1983). Human relations within production systems are a central topic
of analysis for Antonio Gramsci, who Sen (2009, p. 119) credits as ‘perhaps the most innovative
Marxist philosopher of the twentieth century’, while also arguing that Gramsci was a central
influence for Sraffa and Wittgenstein (Sen 2003). The role of power relations in production is
especially present in Gramsci’s (1992, 1996, 2007) analysis of Fordist productive systems (Martins
2017). The role of power relations in production is particularly important at a moment when there
is much uncertainty on the impact of technological change on the skills and human capabilities
that are necessary for engaging in several production activities, an aspect which can bring important
changes to human well-being in the workplace, and to power relationships in production networks.
The changes in unemployment that technological change can bring is also a crucial factor for human
well-being, and for bargaining power within productive systems (Kalecki 1971).
But before arguing for a return to a more ‘productionist’ view, I shall start by explaining how the
evolution of economic theory, and of welfare economics in particular, led to a neglect of the study of
production, to be replaced with an emphasis on market exchange. Afterwards, I shall explain the
emergence of the capability approach to human development, and how it led towards a concern
with final goals measured in terms of the analytical tools developed within welfare economics. I
shall then argue that a greater focus on production is necessary, which can be fruitfully undertaken
through an analysis of the social and economic reproduction of the conditions of production. This
requires studying how social relations of power emerge within productive systems, and social struc-
tures in general, a topic which has been neglected within the capability approach to human devel-
opment, as I shall explain. Some concluding remarks will follow.
Productive Systems, Welfare Economics and Neoliberalism
When the field of development emerged after decolonisation, central topics addressed were indus-
trialisation at an economic level, and modernisation at a sociological level. A key question was how
economies which were primarily agricultural could develop their industries, and societies which were
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primarily rural could change from a more traditional form of life to a more modern one. So earlier
approaches to the problem of development during the post-war period were built around the
idea that development is intrinsically linked to the transformation of the productive system
(Chang 2010). Walt Rostow (1960), for example, conceptualised development in terms of a sequence
of stages of growth leading from a traditional society to a society of mass production after industri-
alisation takes off. In Latin America, there was an attempt of industrialising through the substitution
of imports, while trying to maintain the export of primary goods (Furtado 1964), in contrast to many
Asian countries that instead of substituting imports engaged in a sustained path where industrialis-
ation meant their integration in global value chains (Gereffi et al. 2005) or global production networks
(Henderson et al. 2002), in a process that still continues today.
In fact, the industrialisation of otherwise traditional societies was so ingrained in development dis-
course that some of the most influential models of economic development (in the western bloc for
example) were framed around the idea of a dualism between a traditional sector and a urban indus-
trial sector, where change occurs as population moves from the more traditional sector of the
economy to a modern industrial sector (Dasgupta 1954, Lewis 1954). And influential economists
like Nicholas Kaldor (1978) argued that there is no way to reach development other than industrialis-
ing, and no possibilities for industrialisation other than protecting infant industries, as Chang (2002)
also argued more recently.
In fact, Kaldor (1978) emphasised how effective demand is important not merely for macroeco-
nomic stability, but also for transformations in the productive structure. This concern with industrial-
isation puts the emphasis on the sphere of production and the planning activities that are required in
this regard. In addition to these discussions in the Western world, the Communist world also engaged
in several discussions of planning and development where the transformation of the productive
system was a central concern (Dobb 1969, 2008). Furthermore, in many of these conceptions, the
State was seen as a key player in bringing about the necessary changes in the productive system.
After the oil shocks of the 1970s, the concern with the productive sphere started to switch towards
a concern with the market sphere. Developments within the discipline of welfare economics which
go back to the 1930s were particularly influential in this respect. In fact, the final goals of develop-
ment usually advocated today were shaped within the discipline of welfare economics. And the
developments within this discipline also had important implications for ideas on whether the
State should interfere or not in order to guarantee the fulfilment of those final goals. So it is not
really possible to understand how development thinking switched from an emphasis on production
towards an emphasis on final goals without understanding the evolution of welfare economics,
including not only the impact of this evolution on the definition of the final goals of development,
but also its impact on the conceptualisation of the role of the State in bringing about those final
goals. Thus, I shall now address briefly the key aspects of the evolution of welfare economics
which are relevant to my argument.
Earlier approaches to welfare economics were shaped by the so-called Cambridge ‘welfare’ tra-
dition, founded by Henry Sidgwick, Alfred Marshall and Arthur Cecil Pigou (Harcourt 2003, Martins
2013). In this approach, the final goals to be achieved were defined following the philosophy of uti-
litarianism, to which Sidgwick was a key contributor, together with Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart
Mill. A central presupposition of the Cambridge ‘welfare’ tradition, systematised more concisely by
Arthur Cecil Pigou (1920), is that marginal utility is a decreasing function of income, as widely
believed in the economics discipline after the marginalist revolution of the 1870s. But according
to Pigou (1920), this means that transfers of income from individuals with a greater income (and
thus a lower marginal utility) to individuals with a lower income (and thus a higher marginal
utility) increase overall utility. Thus, the economic analysis that springs from the Cambridge
‘welfare’ tradition provides an argument for redistribution (Putnam 2002, p. 53, Martins 2013).
But the Cambridge ‘welfare’ approach leads to a focus on the redistribution of income after the
productive process in order to achieve certain welfare goals, rather than on the very process of pro-
duction and the distribution it entails through the division of labour. This is especially the case for
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Pigou, who emphasised corrections to market imperfections and externalities without focusing too
much on production. Marshall, in contrast, was much concerned with the concrete reality of pro-
duction and the way in which it is spatially rooted, for example in Marshall’s (1890) analysis of indus-
trial districts, or in Marshall’s (1919) comparison of different productive structures in various countries.
In any case, the idea of redistribution became very influential at Cambridge both amongst those more
concerned with production, and amongst those less concerned with it.
In fact, the idea of redistribution became influential not only in the Marshallian-Pigovian approach,
but also in Keynesian and Marxian circles in Cambridge. John Maynard Keynes (1936) provided a
study of effective demand noting, as Pigou (1920) had also done, how income transfers to individuals
with a lower income, and thus a higher marginal propensity to consume, increase overall consump-
tion, and thus effective demand, as long as investment remains unaffected, which Keynes believed to
be the case, since he believed investment to be determined by other forces, namely the difference
between the marginal efficiency of capital and the interest rate (Martins 2011). Keynes (1936) saw this
idea as the key for a new social philosophy within economics, where greater income equality
enhances not only human welfare, but also economic performance, rather than constraining it.
This idea can still help understanding recent phenomena such as the influence of inequality on
the 2007–2009 financial and economic crisis (Martins 2011).
Even Maurice Dobb (1925), the key Marxian economist at Cambridge (and who was also Sen’s
mentor), used a similar idea in his early writings in order to understand entrepreneurship, noting
how those with a higher income have a lower marginal utility for additional income, and thus a
lower cost of investing, which means that they are more likely to become entrepreneurs than indi-
viduals with less income. That is, Dobb’s (1925) approach ultimately implies that those with lower
incomes, and thus a higher marginal utility for those incomes, will have a greater reluctance in invest-
ing and becoming entrepreneurs. This raises doubts on the usefulness of micro-finance as a means
for bringing individuals out of poverty, to which one may add the question of whether productive
capabilities can really be developed from an individualistic basis, as Chang (2010) also argues, and
as Dobb (2008) also notes in later writings. But in his early writings Dobb (1925) was, just like
Keynes, much influenced by a more Marshallian approach to human welfare, and by the social phil-
osophy according to which redistribution brings positive effects to human welfare.
Utility was seen in more objective terms in the Cambridge ‘welfare’ tradition, rather than as an
irreducibly subjective phenomenon. But the Cambridge social philosophy of redistribution was
soon challenged by Lionel Robbins (1935, 1938), who argued that there is no scientific basis for com-
paring utility levels, since utility is an irreducibly subjective phenomenon. This belief led to various
arguments for a reconfiguration of the role of the State, which should be merely a legislator that guar-
antees fundamental rights. For if human preferences are irreducibly subjective and cannot be com-
pared objectively, the best policy option is to set the rules of the game clearly, so that preferences can
be revealed in market exchange through prices, which become signals that allow for economic
coordination, as argued by Friedrich Hayek, who was with Robbins at the London School of Econ-
omics (LSE) at the time and also advocated a subjectivist view of human preferences, while noting
that much information cannot be codified, and will become manifest only in market prices.
This view contrasts with Dobb’s (1969) approach, who draws on Sraffa’s (1960) objective theory of
value (which recovers the classical approach of measuring value in terms of the objective cost of pro-
duction) to find forms of economic planning and coordination beyond the market, in a context where
the State can play a role in industrialisation and development. But once the focus is on the market as
the main form of economic coordination, any role of the State in planning and economic coordi-
nation is seen as an interference with market efficiency. And it also means, of course, that the empha-
sis of economic policy is no longer on final goals, be they utilitarian or not, but rather on the rules of
the market process, so that each person can pursue her or his own individual goals.
This emphasis on the market sphere reappeared again in Chicago, to where Hayek moved sub-
sequently, albeit assuming in many cases a mathematical form that Hayek and most Austrian econ-
omists would have disapproved of, since they believed the use of mathematics in economics
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constitutes, to a large extent, an erroneous transfer to the social sciences of the habits of thought
developed when dealing with the natural sciences (Hayek 1948). For example, the microfoundations
of New Classical Macroeconomics and Real Business Cycle theory imply that the choices individuals
make are optimal reactions to economic fluctuations caused by exogenous technological shocks. But
for optimal choices to be made, economic agents must know the rules of the game in advance, hence
policy makers must refrain from discretionary intervention, not only regarding fiscal policy, but also
monetary policy (Lucas 1981). In short, while these microfoundations are usually associated with the
Chicago school, the overall idea, devoid of its mathematical formulation, was already present at the
LSE at the time when Robbins and Hayek developed a subjectivist approach against the Cantabrigian
Marshallian and Keynesian approaches, and against Marxist conceptions as well, in the 1930s.
Hayek (1939) went as far as arguing that the creation of a commonmarket within various countries
has the laudable effect of weakening the power of each State, by reducing the possibilities for State
intervention at an economic, political and military level, and opening up the possibilities for peaceful
and prosperous interstate federalism. But Hayek’s emphasis on the market process left aside the
dynamics of the productive system, and the way in which those dynamics are influenced by the
emergence of a common market across various countries. Hayek’s (1939) views of the advantages
of a common market for weakening State power stand in contrast with the perspective of economists
who studied more closely the productive system, rather than looking at the market only as a means of
coordination. Thus, Kaldor (1978), drawing on the Keynesian principle of effective demand, noted
that in a common market with several countries those with more competitive industries at the
initial stage would take a greater share of the common market, leading to further productivity
gains and greater asymmetries within the common market in a process of cumulative causation,
as also noted by Gunnar Myrdal (1957). This analysis remains relevant for understanding contempor-
ary problems in the European Union.
For much of the post-war period, the Keynesian emphasis on the need for investment in order to
achieve effective demand provided the theoretical basis for State intervention in the more developed
economies, while the idea that a developmental state is necessary for fostering industrialisation pro-
vided also the justification for State intervention in developing economies. But after the 1970s
Hayek’s views, first expounded at the LSE and then at Chicago, were instrumental for the emergence
of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism is a form of liberalism that differs from the classical liberalism of the
nineteenth century in various respects, including the greater role of the State in shaping the con-
ditions for the private sector to control the economy, and the emergence of marginalist or neoclas-
sical economic theory as a replacement to the classical economic theory of the nineteenth century.
The emergence of neoliberalism had implications for the analysis of development. Thus Sen (1983), in
his article ‘Development: Which Way Now?’, notes that the neoclassical resurgence was paralleled by
a neoclassical recovery in the field of development. But despite a greater role for the State and the
use of a neoclassical theory where final goals are sometimes considered, the neoliberal emphasis is
still on the rules set by the State so there was never an emphasis on final goals of development in this
neoliberal view, but rather on the market process.
The Emergence of the Capability Approach to Human Development
While Robbins and Hayek defended the expansion of the market essentially in terms of the liberty
that free trade provides (while emphasising the policy implications of their views), other economists
at the LSE, also influenced by Robbins’ (1935, 1938) critique of Marshallian-Pigovian welfare econ-
omics, focused on more technical issues. It is in these more technical contributions that an emphasis
on final goals starts to reappear, albeit not in the same way as in the utilitarian framework of Marshal-
lian-Pigovian welfare economics.
Nicholas Kaldor (1939) and John Hicks (1939) – two authors who subsequently rejected these early
views, with Kaldor actually switching to the Keynesian camp – led to the reformulation of the field of
welfare economics, into what was then called ‘New Welfare Economics’ (Sen 1982). In this new form
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of welfare economics, Robbins’ principle that human preferences are irreducibly subjective and thus
non-comparable is strictly followed. Vilfredo Pareto’s idea of ordinal utility, that is, of considering only
the ordering of options expressed by subjective preferences without attaching any substantive
content to the notion of utility (contrarily to what Sidgwick, Marshall and Pigou did), became particu-
larly important in this conception. Since the utility levels of individuals cannot be measured and com-
pared, no trade-off is possible between individuals, so the goal is to reach what came to be known as
a Pareto optimum (a Pareto optimum is a situation where it is not possible to improve the utility of
any individual without reducing the utility of some other individual).
Arrow and Debreu (1954) connected the role of the market in a general equilibrium framework to
the emergence of a Pareto optimum, further reinforcing the idea that there is no need for the State to
intervene in production, as the market will generate optimal outcomes regarding production and
consumption. In fact, according to Arrow’s (1951) general possibility theorem, there is no guarantee
that collective decisions (such as those taken within a democratic State) will be even rational in
general (at least according to the neoclassical conception of rationality), a result which led the
theorem to be known as the impossibility theorem. Sen (1982, 2017) adopted much of Arrow’s frame-
work in his own approach to social choice theory. But Sen (1982, 2017) drew different policy impli-
cations, arguing that social choices can be made with justifiable criteria in a democratic setting.
Sen (1982, 2017) also noted another important impossibility, namely that a purely liberal view is
incompatible with a Pareto optimum, which seems to bring apart the two views stemming from
Robbins’ (1935, 1938) critique of interpersonal comparisons of utility: the liberal view advocated
by Hayek and the Austrian school; and the use of the Pareto optimum within new welfare economics.
Both views (the liberal and the Paretian one) were soon challenged, in any case. For an adherence to a
strictly liberal view where only rules matter regardless of their consequences for well-being, or a
Pareto optimum, are both compatible with any sort of income distribution, even if cases of
extreme poverty exist. So neither can be used as a criterion when addressing the typical problems
of development regarding income inequality and poverty.
This problem was addressed by several attempts to provide alternative characterisations of well-
being by various authors connected to the old Cambridge ‘welfare’ tradition, such as James Meade
(1976), Anthony Atkinson (1975) and Amartya Sen (1982, 1985), in a way that would allow for some
interpersonal comparisons of well-being – see Fine (1985) – and thus an assessment of inequality.
Atkinson was much influenced by Meade at an earlier stage, and at a later stage worked together
with Thomas Piketty, leading to the construction of the top incomes database (Atkinson et al.
2011). The recent surge of interest in the measurement of inequality draws upon those contributions,
with an emphasis on income and wealth inequality that certainly contributed also to a greater focus
on the goals of development.
Sen’s capability approach (1982, 1985) emerged as an attempt of assessing inequality as well.
However, Sen’s capability approach differs from the perspective of Atkinson (1975) or Piketty
(2014) by focusing not only on income and wealth when addressing inequality, but also on
various other dimensions of human well-being. Sen (1982) engaged in a critique of the marginalist
subjectivist approach to human well-being of new welfare economics, arguing for the need of focus-
ing on more objective functionings, that is, what a human being can be or do, rather than on the
subjective utility obtained with those functionings. The emphasis on functionings also enables
going beyond John Rawls’ (1971) emphasis on primary goods since, according to Sen, development
processes should focus more on how goods affect human beings, and human functionings in particu-
lar, rather than on Rawlsian primary goods.
The human functionings which are achieved lead to a given level of subjective well-being, usually
characterised as a utility level within welfare economics. But Sen (1985) argues that the subjective
preferences of human beings in poverty or deprivation get adapted to those situations, so an analysis
of human well-being must be grounded on objective human functionings instead. This avoids
Robbins’ (1935, 1938) critique of interpersonal comparisons of utility and allows for comparing the
situations of different individuals. Sen (1985) defines human capabilities as the set of potential
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functionings and argues that human capabilities provide a more adequate space for assessing
inequality. This approach, in which inequality and poverty are evaluated in terms of human capabili-
ties, is the capability approach (Sen 1982, 1985). And drawing on the capability approach, Sen (1999)
defines development as the expansion of human capabilities.
Sen’s (1999) conception of development as freedom is one in which the expansion of human
capabilities is a cumulative and self-reinforcing process. Furthermore, Sen (1999) argues that it is pre-
ferable to focus on the overarching objective and final goal of development, rather than on the
specific means for achieving it. And an important reason why this is so is the cumulative and self-rein-
forcing nature of the expansion of human capabilities. The final goal of development, the expansion
of human capabilities, also increases productivity and improves economic performance (Sen 1999),
which gives further reason for focusing directly on the final goals of development, since they are
also the means for development anyway.
An important aspect where this duality of means and ends appears is in the analysis of the market.
Sen (1999) notes how the justification of the role of markets is not just an economic one (connected
to their role in economic coordination), but also a moral one, for freedom of transaction is also valu-
able in itself. That is, the market is a means and an end. Hayek (1948) had also made a similar claim.
But unlike Hayek, Sen (1999) sees much more scope for State intervention when promoting the final
goals of development. However, since Sen’s (1999) emphasis is not on the productive system, but
rather on goals of development which are simultaneously means for development, while focusing
much on the virtues of the market, the type of State intervention advocated by Sen is very far
away from the developmental state concerned with a transformation of the productive sphere.
Rather than a developmental state, Sen’s (1999) analysis presupposes a welfare state, whose interven-
tion is concerned with correcting market imperfections (very much in the Marshallian-Pigovian spirit
of the Cambridge ‘welfare’ tradition), thus enabling the expansion of human capabilities through
improvements in education, health, distribution of income and poverty reduction. The channel
through which the expansion of human capabilities influences the productive sphere is through
increases in human productivity.
Sen’s emphasis on the role of the State contrasts with Rawls’ political liberalism, where the ideal
system would be a property-owning democracy – an idea also advocated by Meade (1976) – that is, a
political system where property is widely distributed since, for Rawls, a welfare state in which prop-
erty is not widely distributed still allows for wide differences of power and status, which will exist even
if the inequalities of income and wealth generated by those differences in power and status can sub-
sequently be attenuated through redistribution by a welfare state. This connection to the structure of
power relations was never addressed by Sen and the human development approach in a satisfactory
way, which at the policy level has focused essentially on the mathematical measurement of human
well-being in multidimensional terms, further contributing to an emphasis on final goals rather than
on the productive structure of the economy and the power relationships it fosters. Sen’s (2017) latest
reedition of his 1970 book Collective Choice and Social Welfare, by emphasising ordinal rankings in a
social choice context, certainly provides further incentive to this emphasis on measurement.
While the indicators of human development produced by the UNDP go beyond the emphasis on
income and wealth that characterised earlier welfare economics, it is also the case that by trying to
condense socio-economic reality into a synthetic indicator, we end up losing sight of too many sig-
nificant aspects of the socio-economic structure. Piketty (2014, pp. 269–270), for example, while
focusing on income and wealth only, ends up paying more attention to class structure by looking
at top incomes (Martins 2015). In fact, Piketty (2014, p. 266) criticises the use of synthetic indexes
of inequality that take attention away from a more sociological analysis of class structure, which
allows for considerations of power and status such as the ones mentioned by Rawls (1971).
The emphasis on the construction of synthetics indexes of inequality, poverty and development is
especially present in the Human Development Reports provided by the UNDP, inspired in the contri-
butions of Sen, and of Mahbub Ul-Haq. The capability approach to human development kept concen-
trating on the measurement of the final goals, at the same time as the expansion of markets through
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the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), subsequently leading to the World Trade Organ-
ization (WTO), and the European Common Market, were further advancing, while reducing the role of
the State, very much as Hayek (1939) had advocated within a ‘neoliberal’ approach aimed at reducing
the influence of the State, and as Keynes had feared when noting the incompatibility between pol-
itical democracy and deregulated and global financial markets.
In political terms, institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank
(WB) moved away from Keynesian ideas and embodied the ‘neoliberal’ agenda, albeit using a math-
ematical methodology that owes little to Hayek and the Austrian school. And at some point these
Bretton Woods institutions started to be influenced by the multidimensional approach to measure-
ment pioneered by the ‘humanistic’ perspective developed at the UNDP, as one can see by looking at
the multidimensional indicators that started to be produced by these institutions. Within this process,
the productive sphere and the power relations it entails were left outside the scope of analysis of
both the ‘neoliberal’ and ‘humanistic’ approaches to development, which were concerned with
the market, rather than with the productive system, even if in the ‘humanistic’ approach there is a
much greater stress on the final goals that the market must deliver.
In the opening paragraph of the introduction of Sen’s 1999 book Development as Freedom, pub-
lished shortly after receiving the Memorial Nobel Award in 1998, Sen (1999, p. 3) sets out the outline
of a research programme in development studies that became widely influential, while also writing:
‘Focusing on freedoms contrasts with narrower views of development, such as identifying develop-
ment with the growth of gross national product, or with the rise in personal incomes, or with indus-
trialisation, or with technological advance, or with social modernisation’. This shifts the central
emphasis away from industrialisation, technological advance and social modernisation, which
were seen as central concerns within the more ‘productionist’ approaches to development.
This leads us to the following question: can the capability approach to human development still
contribute towards a more ‘productionist’ approach to development, or is it destined to become
more and more blended with the ‘neoliberal’ view focused on the role of the market? The capability
approach to human development has its intellectual roots in classical political economy, rather than
in neoclassical economics (Walsh 2000, 2003, Putnam 2002, Martins 2013). Thus, Vivian Walsh (2000,
2003) suggests combining Sen’s capability approach, which recovers the moral anthropology of the
classical economists, with Piero Sraffa’s theory of production (1960), which recovers the analytical
theory of the classical economists, developed to its more advanced stage by Marx in his labour
theory of value. But this emphasis on production has had little impact on the literature on the capa-
bility approach. I shall turn to this issue now, highlighting the need of focusing on the analysis of
power relationships within productive systems.
The Reproduction of the Conditions of Production
It is important to note that the classical theory of production, and the theory of value it entails, is more
compatible with the contemporary reality of global production networks than neoclassical economic
theory. Sraffa (1925, 1926) shows several inconsistencies that arise if we use the neoclassical theory of
value for analysing integrated productive systems, due to the neglect of the production of com-
ponents common to various industries. As Sen (2003) notes, Sraffa (1960) provided an integrated
view of the conditions of production where it is possible to determine the relative prices of all com-
modities knowing only the distribution of income between capital and labour (by knowing either the
wage or the interest rate) and the quantities of commodities produced and used as means of pro-
duction, without having to assume constant returns to scale. This makes Sraffa’s analysis particularly
relevant for a wide variety of interconnected systems. Also, Sraffa’s (1960) system shows how the dis-
tribution of income can be driven by a concern with a certain standard of living (Wilkinson 2012) or by
the financial system through the money rate of interest (Sraffa 1960, p. 33). This expresses a power
struggle between the demands of the financial system and the overall standard of living, which is well
captured in Sraffa’s (1960) system.
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Sraffa (1960) adopts the method that Marx employed when developing classical political
economy, which consists of analysing the conditions of reproduction of economic activity (Martins
2013, p. 44). But Sraffa focuses only on the conditions for the reproduction of the means of pro-
duction, and not on the conditions of reproduction of labour power. In fact, the standard of living
is an exogenous aspect in Sraffa’s (1960) system, and this is why Walsh (2000, 2003) suggests adopt-
ing Sen’s capability approach to fill this gap. Walsh (2000, 2003) suggests that we should use the
capability approach for determining the standard of living within Sraffa’s (1960) system, thus bringing
a moral dimension to the analysis, an idea which is seen in positive terms by Martha Nussbaum
(2003).
The standard of living must be seen as an end in itself, as the human development approach
argues, rather than a means only. But it certainly influences the productive system, through its
influence on the reproduction of labour power (Wilkinson 1983, 2012). Health and education, two
central topics for human development, play a central role in the reproduction of labour power,
and its treatment within the capability approach to human development can be helpful in this
regard. One cannot, however, merely juxtapose the capability approach with Sraffa’s (1960) theory
and with further considerations on how health and education contribute to the reproduction of
labour power. This is part of an important concern raised by Ben Fine (2001) at a more general
level: has it been possible to add on themes to Sen’s framework of analysis, or did Sen’s framework
end up being reconstructed in the process (see also Fine 2004)?
The key problem at stake here requires a more serious investigation on the nature the capability
approach, and of Sen’s contribution. The capability approach is not an economic theory, for an econ-
omic theory would have to characterise specific mechanisms, for example specific mechanisms
through which wages determine prices, as Sraffa (1960) does. It is also not a fully-fledged ethical
theory, for an ethical theory would have to provide a prescriptive criterion, and the capability
approach provides only the space of human functionings and capabilities for assessing well-being,
not a prescriptive criterion. The capability approach does not answer questions such as ‘how does
this mechanism function’, as a scientific theory would, nor questions such as ‘what should be
done’, as a moral theory would (Martins 2007).
Quite the contrary, Sen’s capability approach provides answers to questions such as: ‘what is a
human functioning?’, which is defined as what a human being is or does; ‘what is well-being?’,
which is defined in terms of achieved human functionings; ‘what is a capability?’, which is described
as a potential functioning; or ‘what is development?’, which is defined in terms of the expansion of
human capabilities. But questions of the form ‘what is X?’ are ontological questions, that is, they are
questions regarding the nature of things, be it the nature of human functioning, well-being, capabili-
ties or development. And Sen’s (2002) other contributions follow a similar vein, answering questions
such as ‘what is rationality?’, which is defined as the freedom to scrutinise goals and values.
This is connected to the influence of Dobb’s notion of ‘rich description’ on Sen, as Walsh (2003)
notes, with the approval of Sen (2005). What Sen provides is a ‘rich description’ of human function-
ings, well-being, capabilities, rationality and development. This is, of course, a rudimentary ontology,
since it does not go beyond taxonomy and definition of specific objects, and a fuller engagement
with ontology would require addressing the relations and properties of those objects (Lawson
2017, p. 50). Regarding human functioning, for example, Nussbaum (2000, p. 13) writes that although
Sen ‘occasionally alludes both to Marx and to Aristotle’, Sen has never ‘attempted to ground the capa-
bilities approach in the Marxian/Aristotelian idea of truly human functioning that plays a central role
in my argument’, thus suggesting that despite Sen’s many remarks to Marxian/Aristotelian (and
Smithian) philosophical foundations, he never engaged in a sustained way with the Marxian/Aristo-
telian philosophical foundations of the capability approach.
Sen’s allusions to Marx are revealing nevertheless, for example when Sen (2009, p. 245) draws on
what he sees as Marx’s admirable clarity when explaining social relations, noting that when someone
acts ‘it would be hard to understand why and how he or she undertakes these activities without some
comprehension of his or her societal relations’ – see also Martins (2012, p. 145) for a discussion. Still,
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Nussbaum (2000, p. 13) is right to note that Sen does not really elaborate enough these insights. Sen’s
contribution is best interpreted as an ontological exercise, but an essentially descriptive one that
stays at the more basic (taxonomic) level of social ontology, without delving deep into the analysis
of social relations of power. But this also means that, being an essentially a taxonomic ontological
exercise, Sen’s capability approach is not a fully-fledged ethical theory for, as Sen (2009, p. 41)
notes, ‘ethics cannot be simply a matter of truthful description of specific objects’.
The lack of sustained ontological reflection on the capability approach contributes much to the
tendency to add on themes to the capability framework without really questioning and possibly
revising its very foundations. However, a study of the reproduction of labour power requires an analy-
sis of the foundations of the capability approach, in order to achieve a better understanding of the
relation between individual agency and social structure within the capability approach (Martins 2006,
2007, 2012, Smith and Seward 2009), so that the power relations that arise in social structures can be
best understood, within a social ontology that does not merely describe social entities (as Sen often
does), but also addresses the way in which power emerges trough social relations (Martins 2006,
Lawson 2012).
Furthermore, it is not only the reproduction of labour power, but also the reproduction of the
material means of production that can benefit from a social ontology of power relations, as Clive
Lawson (2017, pp. 39–44) shows when studying technology from a social ontology perspective.
Sraffa’s (1960) study of the reproduction of the material means of production is pitched at a rather
abstract level, and needs to be complemented with an analysis of the connections between technol-
ogy and power. Ilse Oosterlaken (2011) suggests using Lawson’s (2010) analysis of how technology
extends human capabilities in the context of the capability approach, and this is a topic that certainly
requires further elaboration.
Lawson (2017, p. 109) defines ‘technical activity as that activity which harnesses the causal
capacities and powers of material artefacts in order to extend human capabilities’. But Lawson
(2017, p. 50) also notes that ontology cannot be merely the definition of objects, as argued above.
Rather, ontology must address the properties of the entities defined, and the relation between
those entities. Lawson (2017, p. 42) notes that ‘social relations are always power relations’, drawing
on Tony Lawson’s (2012) social ontology, and provides an account of how technical objects are
enrolled in those social relations, going beyond a merely taxonomic approach to the ontology of
technology.
An understanding of the enrolment of technical objects in social relations of power is one of the
central aspects to take into account when addressing industrialisation in development processes.
Different technologies are adopted by different communities characterised by different social struc-
tures, and the penetration of capitalist relations and technological rhythms is often at dissonance
with the social rhythms of the traditional societies that initiate a process of industrialisation,
leading to a coexistence of rhythms and modes of life that shapes the pattern of development
processes.
Furthermore, it is also necessary to investigate whether the extension of human capabilities
brought by technology actually increases human well-being, or merely contributes to turn human
beings into a more efficient appendage of a larger process motored by capital. Harry Braverman
(1974) notes how technology is often designed in a way that enables the owners of capital to
control the labour process, as Lawson (2017, p. 182) also argues drawing on Braverman (1974).
This control of the labour process also enables taking advantage of human capabilities that are
often developed through non-capitalist social structures, through processes of social reproduction
taking place in the household. An example consists of unpaid labour in the household that contrib-
utes to the reproduction of labour power (Silver 2003), which is essential for capitalist accumulation.
As a solution to this question, Silvia Federici (1975) suggests the payment of wages for housework,
so that it acquires a similar status in capitalism as other forms of work. Federici (1975, p. 5, original
emphasis) notes that ‘money is capital, i.e. it is the power to command labour’. This corresponds to
Sraffa’s (1960) view of objective value in capitalism as commanded labour (how much labour can
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a commodity purchase in the market), echoing Smith (1999, p. 37), who like Sraffa measures the cost
of production in terms of commanded labour, and cites approvingly Thomas Hobbes when he claims
that wealth is power, meaning the power to command the labour of others (Martins 2016, p. 33). Fed-
erici’s (1975) argument points our attention to the fact that housework is not empowering under
capitalism, where power depends upon wealth that allows for commanding labour (Smith 1999,
p. 37, Martins 2016, p. 33).
As Isabella Baker (2007, p. 545) notes, Federici (2003) addresses the rationalisation of the reproduc-
tion of labour power that takes place under capitalism, a rationalisation that enables a process similar
to the one Marx describes as primitive accumulation, that is, a penetration of capitalism into non-
capitalist social relations. In the specific case addressed by Federici (2003), what is at stake is not
the expropriation of common lands as in Marx’s account of primitive accumulation, but rather a sub-
ordination of social reproduction in households to the demands of capital – for another view of
accumulation, see also Maria Mies (1999).
An important aspect to take into account in this regard is that household training often endows
young women with crucial capabilities to be employed in the technologies adopted in global value
chains or global production networks, in what constitutes an enrolment of technology in social
relations of power – to use Lawson’s (2017) terminology – that contributes essentially to put
human capabilities at the service of capitalist accumulation, rather than contributing to human
well-being. Training of young women ‘received from their mothers and other female kin since
early infancy’ (Elson and Pearson 1981, p. 93) are examples of unpaid labour that contributes to
the reproduction of labour power, while also influencing relations of production through the ‘subor-
dination of women as a gender’ (Elson and Pearson 1981, p. 94, original emphasis).
The qualities attributed to women in the reproduction of labour power are thus not innate qual-
ities, but rather socially reproduced, and a crucial aspect in the reproduction of the conditions of
economic activity, together with the reproduction of the technical means of production. In addition
to the ethical issues involved in social reproduction, the very sustainability of the economic system is
also a crucial matter. Asymmetric power relations within processes of social reproduction can often
lead to depletion (Rai et al. 2014), and to the deterioration of the human capabilities that Sen (1999)
sees as (economic) means and (ethical) ends of development.
Notions such as global value chains (Gereffi et al. 2005) or global production networks (Henderson
et al. 2002) point towards a process of production scattered across various spatial locations, in a
context where the State does not play the same role as in earlier approaches to industrialisation
based on the idea of a developmental state. The idea of a ‘network’ of production (Henderson
et al. 2002) has been proposed in order to capture the idea that multiple interactions take place at
a more horizontal level within the productive sphere. And the emphasis on ‘production’ rather
than on a ‘commodity chain’ emphasises the social process through which commodities are pro-
duced, opening the door to considerations relative to power relationships.
But much literature on global value chains and global production networks has been centred on
firms (Selwyn 2012), and it is important to understand the overall process of social reproduction
involved in global value chains and global production networks. Human capabilities can be best
understood as a consequence of social reproduction which constitutes, together with the reproduc-
tion of the technical means of production, the two main processes to analyse when studying the con-
ditions of reproduction of the economic system, bringing the productive sphere back into focus, as
Chang (2010) suggests we should. But in order to undertake this analysis, it is also necessary to
rethink the very idea of capability as a causal power grounded in social structures (Martins 2006,
2013) which, when actualised in the labour process, provides an essential ingredient for the reproduc-
tion of the economic system.
Sen’s original formulation of his ideas in a 1978 lecture in Stockholm – published later in the 1984
collection Resources, Values and Development (Sen 1984) – was more helpful in this regard, since Sen
(1984, p. 281) used then the term primary powers, to be contrasted with Rawls’ (1971) primary goods.
But this terminology was abandoned in the following year, in the 1979 Tanner Lecture at Stanford
414 N. O. MARTINS
titled Equality of What?, subsequently published in the 1982 collection Choice, Welfare and Measure-
ment (Sen 1982). In this 1979 lecture, often seen as the originator of the capability approach, Sen
introduces the term basic capabilities as a contrast to basic needs (Sen 1982, p. 367), and the
notion of power ceases to play a central role, as it should be in an analysis of social and economic
reproduction – see also Marianne Hill (2003) on why rather than advocating development as
freedom (Sen 1999), one should focus on development as empowerment.
Concluding Remarks
A fruitful way to address the new challenges of development raised by Chang (2010) is to further inte-
grate Sen’s ‘humanistic’ approach to development with considerations regarding power relationships
in the productive structure, by seeing the formation of human capabilities as part of the overall
process of social reproduction of labour power, together with an analysis of the conditions of repro-
duction of the technology involved in the means of production (Sraffa 1960, Lawson 2017). In fact,
while Chang (2010) is very critical of the ‘neoliberal’ view of development, his argument towards
the ‘humanistic’ approach is not that it should be dismissed, but rather integrated with the ‘produc-
tionist’ approach into a ‘new developmentalism’.
But this requires a different view of the capability approach, as a component of a broader analysis
of the process of social and economic reproduction. Walsh’s (2003) suggestion of combining Sen’s
capability approach with Sraffa’s (1960) classical theory of production is very helpful in this regard,
if we see Sraffa’s (1960) theory as a component of a broader study of the reproduction of the technical
means of production (Lawson 2017), and Sen’s capability approach as a component of a broader
study of the reproduction of labour power, where the latter should not be seen merely in instrumen-
tal terms (as human capital), but also taking into account human well-being in the workplace as a goal
to achieve (Braverman 1974, Silver 2003, Wilkinson 1983, 2012).
Another important contribution made by Sen that is helpful in this regard concerns his interpret-
ation of the labour theory of value. Following Dobb again, Sen (1978) emphasises (like Sraffa in some
instances) that it is essential to engage in a full description of the labour process as a whole, so as to
get a full grasp of the relations of production (Martins 2012). Sen (1978) goes as far as arguing that the
labour theory of value can be best interpreted as a description of the overall process of production,
rather than in quantitative terms. Sen’s (1978) descriptive interpretation of the labour theory of value
(Martins 2012) suggests a broader view of the labour process, and of the role of human capabilities
within the productive system. In fact, surplus-producing labour can be interpreted as a human capa-
bility (Düzenli 2016).
This broader view has not been much pursued so far given the emphasis on measuring human
capabilities that has been the more visible aspect of the capability approach to human development.
By focusing almost exclusively on measuring human capabilities, many ‘capability theorists’ end up
moving away from the humanistic roots of Sen’s capability approach. Quite significantly, Sen himself
has recently declared he is not a ‘capability theorist’, as noted by Baujard and Gilardone (2017) when
emphasising the humanistic roots of Sen’s contribution. In fact, I would go further and argue there is
no such thing as ‘capability theory’, if the term is to be used in any meaningful way. The capability
approach is not a social or economic theory, but rather a philosophical perspective (Martins 2006),
for the reasons outlined above. Thus, it must be combined with a substantive theory, be it Sraffa’s
classical theory of production as argued by Walsh (2000, 2003) and Putnam (2002), or other, in
order for more substantive analysis of the production process to proceed (Martins 2015, 2013).
The human development project is thus facing a dilemma, which is connected to a wider problem
within development theorising. This wider problem consists in an excessive emphasis on final goals
rather than on the productive structures that enable the achievement of those goals. This leads to the
relative neglect of productive systems in development discourse, and the way in which those pro-
ductive systems interact with human capabilities. The capability approach to human development
has the potential to become a relevant component of the analysis of this wider problem, if
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conceptualised as part of a broader study of the process of social and economic reproduction, taking
into account the relationship between individual agency and social structure (Martins 2006, 2007,
2012, Smith and Seward 2009, Oosterlaken 2011), so that the power relations that arise in social struc-
tures can be best understood. But this potential remains yet far from realised.
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